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I. INTRODUCTION
With a letter signed by more than 300 civil society groups in tow,
demonstrators descended on the World Bank’s headquarters in
Washington, D.C. on a spring morning last year to protest an
investment arbitration initiated by a Canadian mining company
against the government of El Salvador. The demonstrators accused
the mining company of using the arbitral process to “subvert a
democratic nationwide debate over mining and environmental
health.” 1 According to the investors, the dispute concerns the nonissuance of a concession because of a de facto moratorium on
mining. The move was taken to allow the government to study the
environmental impact of mining on, among other things, the
country’s scarce water resources. This case is not an anomaly but
rather exemplifies the growing number of investor-state disputes in
which private business interests collide with public interest laws.
Investment arbitration provides an international forum for foreign
investors to air their grievances over governmental conduct that
ostensibly contravenes a treaty obligation. Although the earliest
investment disputes can be traced to the 1970s, 2 most cases
implicating environmental policies have only emerged in the last
fifteen years. 3 The emergence of environment-related disputes
reflects shifting societal perceptions about the importance of
1. Claire Provost, El Salvador Groups Accuse Pacific Rim of “Assault on
Democratic Governance”, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.
com/global-development/2014/apr/10/el-salvador-pacific-rim-assault-democraticgovernance.
2. See INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVEST. DISPUTES, THE ICSID
CASELOAD – STATISTICS 7-8 (2014), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/
ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSD%20Web%20Stats%202014-2%20
(English).pdf (identifying nine ICSID cases registered in the 1970s, a fraction of
the annual ICSID cases since the late 1990s).
3. See JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18 (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2012)
(explaining that only four investment disputes with environmental components
occurred prior to the year 2000).
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sustainable development. Disputes have sometimes arisen when a
government’s environmental policies have negatively affected an
investor’s bottom-line.
Given the breadth of environmental regulation, these cases
covered an array of industrial sectors and involved governmental
actions aimed at combating pollution, conserving natural resources,
and protecting fragile ecosystems and endangered species. Alarm set
in amongst public interest groups as States were hauled before
international tribunals for denying permits to operate landfills, 4
prohibiting the manufacture of toxic chemicals, 5 refusing to grant
licenses for water extraction, 6 disallowing mining activities, 7 tackling
4. See, e.g., Gallo v. Canada, PCA Case No. 55798, Award, ¶ 121
(Permanent Court of Arbitration 2011), http://www.international.gc.ca/ (revocation
of mine-site waste disposal approval); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 39, 139, 144,
147, 149 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158 (2004) (rejection of landfill
renewal authorization); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, at 99-100 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. FILJ 165
(2001) (rejection of construction permit for a landfill).
5. See, e.g., Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Canada, Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 1,
3b-c (UNCITRAL 2011) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (restrictions on the sale and use of
pesticide); Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶¶ 11-13 (UNCITRAL 2010)
(Kluwer Law Int’l) (lindane-treated food product ban); Methanex Corp. v. United
States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part II Ch. D ¶ 2
(UNCITRAL 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf
(methanol-based gasoline mixture ban); S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award
on Liability, ¶¶ 127-28 (UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer Law Int’l)
(industrial waste transport prohibition); Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 5
(UNCITRAL June 24, 1998) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (unleaded gasoline mixture ban).
6. See, e.g., Sun Belt Water, Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a
Claim to Arbitration, ¶¶ 4, 13, 16 (UNCITRAL 1998), http://www.transnationaldispute-management.com (explaining claimant’s argument that respondent’s
moratorium on water exports was intended to favor domestic investors over
foreign ones).
7. See, e.g., Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case
No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, ¶ 1.8
(June 1, 2012) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (discussing arbitral proceedings against El
Salvador for refusing permits to a mining company); Clayton v. Canada, Notice of
Arbitration, ¶¶ 10-11 (UNCITRAL 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw1143.pdf (explaining the claimant’s argument that
Canada’s environmental assessment of a coastal quarry project was unfair,
arbitrary, and discriminatory); see also Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (Sept. 22, 2014)
(adjudicating a claim by a mining company against Venezuela for its termination
of mining concessions in an environmentally-sensitive area).
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claims of environmental harm arising from oil extraction operations, 8
and halting tourist development projects in ecologically-sensitive
locations. 9 There is no slowdown of these disputes in sight. Indeed, a
new generation of cases is on the horizon springing from shifts in
governmental policies on renewable energy, 10 fracking, 11
8. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶
3-4 (UNCITRAL 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0155_0.pdf (summarizing claimant’s grievance that Ecuador colluded with
Ecuadorian plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio litigation that seek damages and other
remedies for environmental impacts in a former concession area).
9. See, e.g., Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case Nos.
ARB/08/1, ARB/09/20, Award, ¶¶ 191, 219, 223, 230, 234, 255, 258 (May 16,
2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1052.pdf
(determining that, while Costa Rica had violated article 4(2) of its BIT with
Germany by adjoining a wildlife refuge through its regulation of claimant’s
property, the claimant failed to carry out its evidentiary burden for most of its
claims); Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID
Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, ¶¶ 16-17, 81-82 (Feb. 17, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev.
169 (2000) (finding for the claimant in a case which arose when Costa Rica
expropriated property for ecological concerns that the claimant intended to develop
as a resort).
10. See, e.g., Vattenfall AB v. Fed. Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No.
ARB/12/12, Decision Pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rules 41(5) (July 2, 2013),
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20130704_2 (commenting on the pending
status of an arbitration based on Germany’s decision to phase out the use of
nuclear power plants in the country); Mercer Int’l Inc. v. Government of Can.,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/3, Request for Arbitration, ¶¶ 24-25 (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1508.pdf (asserting that
Canada violated its obligations under NAFTA by unreasonably regulating the
production of energy from biofuels, specifically wood pulp); AES Solar v. Spain,
Decision on Bifurcation (UNCITRAL 2013), http://iareporter.com/articles/201306
17_1 (reporting on investor’s claim that 2010 cuts to tariffs paid to solar energy
producers were contrary to earlier commitments of the Spanish government and its
obligations under the Energy Charter Treaty); Windstream Energy LLC v. Canada,
Amended Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 12, 22, 31-32, 36 (UNCITRAL 2013),
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com (alleging that Canada, through
the actions of the Government of Ontario opposing a wind energy feed-in tariff
contract, acted inconsistently with its obligations under Chapter 11 of NAFTA);
Mesa Power Grp., LLC v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 6, 46-48 (UNCITRAL
2011),
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com
(asserting
the
Government of Ontario applied arbitrary and unfair rules for awarding FIT
Program contracts that hinder the ability for wind energy production); see also
Dutch Affiliates of US Energy Company, NextEra, Are the Latest to Sue Spain at
ICSID, IA REPORTER (May 27, 2014), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/2014052
71/print (stating that Dutch affiliates of the U.S. solar energy company, NextEra,
had filed an arbitration claim against Spain with ICSID for charges resulting from
Spain’s investment incentive roll-back and became one of many other companies
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biodiversity, 12 and climate change mitigation. 13
Environment-related disputes by their nature involve a tension
and, at times, a direct conflict between competing obligations of the
State to, on one hand, promote foreign investment and, on the other
hand, protect its population and territory from environmental harm
while responsibly managing its natural resources. States face the
challenge of reconciling these competing demands—a task made
even more formidable by its international investment commitments.
Expanding on themes developed at the American University
International Law Review Symposium, 14 this article explores to what
extent investor-state arbitration is equipped to deal with
environment-related disputes. Section II analyzes the treaties
themselves and classifies the main types of environmental clauses
most commonly found in bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”). The
article then examines how environmental disputes have been
resolved in investor-State arbitrations to date in Section III. Section
IV provides an appraisal of the main challenges of adjudicating
environmental disputes and suggests ways to make investment
arbitration more responsive to environmental concerns. Section V
assesses the prospects for managing environmental concerns through
investment arbitration. In short, the article concludes that to ensure
greater support from both the users and observers of the system,
investor-state arbitration could be more sensitive to environmental

to do so).
11. See, e.g., Lone Pine Res. Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 11-12
(UNCITRAL 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
law1596.pdf (arguing that Lone Pine was unfairly denied the “valuable right to
mine for oil and gas” through the process of fracking without due process,
compensation, or cognizable public purpose).
12. See, e.g., Myanmar’s Foreign Investment Law 2012 (designating
businesses for “farming agriculture,” “breeding,” and “Marine Fisheries” as
restricted or prohibited activities).
13. See generally Kate Miles, Arbitrating Climate Change: Regulatory
Regimes and Investor-State Disputes, 1 CLIMATE L. 76 (2010) (“It is the
emergence of this approach in investor-state arbitral jurisprudence that causes
concern for the implementation of new environmental protection measures,
including new climate change mitigation regulation.”).
14. One of the authors participated as a panelist in the American University
International Law Review’s 2014 Symposium: Managing the Global Environment
Through Trade: WTO, TPP and TTIP Negotiations, and Bilateral Investment
Treaties Versus Regional Trade Agreements, that took place on February 18, 2014.

388

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[30:3

policy concerns through the invocation of various procedural,
evidentiary, and conceptual tools.

II. CURRENT STATUS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CLAUSES IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
International investment agreements, such as bilateral investment
treaties and investment chapters in regional trade agreements,
provide the legal basis for investor-state claims by defining the
contours of a State’s consent to arbitrate. 15 These agreements
typically set out procedural preconditions for submitting a claim, the
substantive obligations owed by the contracting states to a foreign
investor, and remedies available in the event of a breach. The text of
investment agreements is therefore a logical starting point to analyze
the legal basis for arbitral tribunals to balance a State’s
environmental policy concerns with its investment protection
commitments.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
recently conducted a survey of international investment agreements
to catalogue environmental references and made three important
observations. 16 First, most BITs do not contain language referring to
environmental concerns (they are found in just 6.5 percent of these
treaties), but such references are more common in free trade
agreements. 17 Second, while environmental language has appeared in
BITs since the mid-1980s, language relating to environmental
concerns became more common in recent BITs. 18 In fact, nearly half
15. See, e.g., Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/1, Award, ¶ 168 (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.transnational-disputemanagement.com (explaining that state consent provides the foundation of the
arbitration proceedings that arise from treaty commitments).
16. Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in
International Investment Agreements: A Survey 5 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation &
Dev. Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 2011/01, 2011) (providing
that its study was based on environmental concerns that appear in a sample of
1,623 international investment agreements across forty-nine countries).
17. Id. (emphasis omitted) (“Language referring to environmental concerns is
rare in BITs but common in non-BIT IIAs. In the treaty sample, 133, or 8.2
[percent], of the IIAs contain a reference to environmental concerns. All 30 nonBIT IIAs contain such references, but only 6.5 [percent] of BITs do.”).
18. Id. (explaining that environmental language appeared in a BIT for the first
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of new treaties concluded since 2005 reference the environment in
some way. Third, countries vary widely in the content and custom of
including such language. 19
Since the scope and content of protections vary from treaty to
treaty, a complete taxonomy of environment-related provisions is
impractical. Furthermore, the language used in a specific investment
agreement must be analyzed according to general principles of treaty
interpretation to properly determine its legal significance. With that
said, general observations can be made regarding the classes of
environment-related provisions typically found in investment
agreements. These provisions broadly reflect three main themes,
each demonstrating the distinct policy goals of the contracting
parties: (1) to recognize environmental protection as a treaty
objective; (2) to preserve the right of States to regulate
environmental matters; and (3) to ensure the continuing duty of
States to enforce and promote environmental protection measures.
The first set of references recognizes environmental protection and
conservation amongst the treaty’s objectives. These references
comprise the second most common category of environmental
language. 20 Often this type of language is in the treaty’s preamble. 21
The preamble of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT illustrates this point:
“Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the
protection of health, safety, and the environment.” 22
Although these clauses do not typically prescribe a hierarchy of
legal obligations, they serve a useful function by confirming that
environmental protection is a concern of the parties. General
principles of treaty interpretation recognize the role of preambles.
According to article 31(1)(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, the preamble provides context for interpretation and may

time in 1985 between China-Singapore and sparked a trend which would lead to a
fifty percent increase of such provisions by 2005).
19. Id. at 9-10 (noting that environmental references are most commonly
found in BITs from Canada, New Zealand, Japan, United States, and Finland).
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id.
22. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE pmbl. (2012), www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20
for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
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provide background on the object and purpose of the treaty. 23 In
practice, foreign investment decisions at times de-emphasize
preamble clauses when identifying the object and purpose of a
treaty. 24 One commentator surmises that this may occur when the
object and purpose of the treaty is obvious or the preamble is poorly
drafted. 25 It may also reflect the differing legal cultures from which
arbitrators are drawn; for example, an adjudicator hailing from a civil
law culture may be more likely to view the treaty text, including the
preamble, holistically. Nevertheless, the fact remains that preamble
clauses may provide a useful starting point in this analysis.
The second category of provisions affirms a contracting party’s
right to regulate environmental matters. This is the oldest and most
common category of environmental language. 26 These provisions
vary widely in scope and may be framed as exceptions, exclusions,
or carve-outs. For example, some international investment treaties
adopt language similar to article XX of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) excepting measures taken for reasons of
“human, animal or plant life or health,” 27 “conservation of

23. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that States interpret treaties in the full context of a
given treaty’s preamble and annexes, as well as any collateral agreements the
respective parties may have signed); see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY
LAW AND PRACTICE 336-37 (2000) (stating that drafters often use preamble
language to mollify opponents of a majority view and accordingly drafters must
keep in mind article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to ensure
preambles are not inconsistent with substantive provisions of a treaty); RICHARD
GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 186 (2008) (arguing that treaty preambles
help identify the object and purpose of a treaty).
24. See, e.g., Philip Morris Brands SARL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 201 (July 2, 2013),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC3592_En&caseId=C1000 (“The Preamble therefore
does not materially advance analysis. Likewise, the reference in the Preamble . . .
appears too general to permit the drawing of definitive conclusions regarding the
need for the investment to contribute to the host state’s economic development.”).
25. J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION ¶ 3.80 (2012).
26. Gordon & Pohl, supra note 16, at 11 (“Use of this category of language
began in 1985, and is therefore among the oldest categories of language.”).
27. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments art. XVII(3)(b), Can.-Egypt, Nov. 13, 1996.
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exhaustible natural resources,” 28 or “protection of national treasures
of artistic, historic or archaeological value.” 29
Treaties commonly include a more general policy space clause,
such as those included in the Canada, United States, and Norway
Model BITs. 30 An example of a broad policy space clause can be
found in article III(1) of Annex I of the Canada-Costa Rica Foreign
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement: “[n]othing in this
Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting,
maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this
Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns.” 31
28. Bilateral Investment Treaty Between the Government of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the Republic of Singapore art. 18(e),
Jordan-Sing., May 16, 2004 (Kluwer Law Int’l).
29. Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the Liberalization,
Promotion, and Protection of Investment art. 19(1)(f), Japan-Peru, Nov. 22, 2008
(Kluwer Law Int’l).
30. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, art. 12(5)
(“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting,
maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”); Canada Model
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, INV. TREATY
ARBITRATION art. 10(1) (2004), http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPAmodel-en.pdf 1/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Canada Model BIT]
(emphasizing that parties are entitled to take reasonable actions to protect
ecological resources); Norway Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments (Draft Version 191207), INV. TREATY ARBITRATION art. 12,
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1031.pdf (last visited Jan. 22,
2015) [hereinafter Norway Model BIT] (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure
that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or
environmental concerns.”).
31. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Costa Rica for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. III(1)
of Annex I, Can.-Costa Rica, Mar. 18, 1998, available at http://www.treatyaccord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=101533; see North American Free Trade
Agreement art. 1114(1), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA] (emphasis omitted); see also The Dominican RepublicCentral American Free Trade Agreement, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE art. 10.11
(2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset
uploadfile328_4718.pdf [hereinafter CAFTA-DR] (ensuring States can take
“appropriate” measures to ensure investors conduct themselves in a “sensitive”
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These clauses intend to carve out regulatory space for States to
achieve policy goals without breaching their substantive obligations.
A state party that invokes such a provision bears the burden of
proving that the exception applies and the relevant criteria are
satisfied. 32 If successfully invoked, the exception may obviate the
State’s obligation to pay compensation for the offending conduct.
However, how tribunals will interpret these clauses is uncertain. To
date, investment tribunals have generally interpreted other exception
clauses restrictively. 33 One reason for this might be the “otherwise
consistent with this Agreement” language, which arbitrators could
read to weaken these policy space clauses. 34 Looking ahead,
investment tribunals interpreting reservations may borrow from
analogous legal constructs, such as the customary law plea of
necessity, 35 non-precluded measure exceptions, 36 or the analytical

manner regarding environmental issues); Gordon & Pohl, supra note 16, at 11
(concluding that provisions ensuring a contracting parties’ right to “[reserve]
environmental policy space” are one of the most common provisions found across
a sample of several treaties).
32. See Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International Investment
Agreements, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 355,
362-63 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011).
33. Id. at 361; see also Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 373 (Sept. 28, 2007), https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC694
_En&caseId=C8 (stating that parties cannot interpret treaties to use policy space
provisions as an “escape route” from obligations to which they are normally bound
under a treaty); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 331 (May 22, 2007) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (limiting
the object and purpose of article 11 of the United States and Argentinean
investment treaty to specific situations involving economic “difficulty and
hardship” and requiring that it should be narrowly interpreted).
34. But see Gordon & Pohl, supra note 16, at 21 (citing NAFTA and stating
that many treaties include policy space provisions that allow those States to take
otherwise prohibited actions without facing sanctions).
35. See VIÑUALES, supra note 3, at 384 (observing that in evaluating claims of
GATT violations, WTO tribunals are more frequently interpreting the doctrine of
“necessity” liberally).
36. See generally William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment
Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of NonPrecluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L.
307, 311-13 (2008) (discussing the increasing prevalence of non-precluded
measure provisions, which allow States to take actions otherwise prohibited by
treaty obligations when such actions are taken in pursuit of expressly permitted
public policy purposes).
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approach of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), 37 depending on
the precise wording of the relevant provision.
A subset of these provisions clarifies that certain regulatory action
relating to environmental matters may not be the basis for a
compensatory claim under the investment agreement. For example,
some provisions carve out an exception for specific disciplines, such
as performance requirements. 38 A small number of Model BITs also
establish that non-discriminatory measures designed to serve a public
health, safety, or environmental protection objective do not constitute
an indirect expropriation. 39 Other treaties exclude environmental
provisions altogether from application of the dispute settlement

37. See generally Newcombe, supra note 32, at 363, 365 (explaining that the
WTO Appellate Body follows a weighing and balancing analysis “of either
restrictive or wide interpretation, in interpreting the meaning of ‘necessary’ for the
purposes of the general exceptions in GATT,” rather than a strict formalistic
approach).
38. See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 7(2), Can.-Peru, Nov. 14, 2006,
available at http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105078 (providing
that measures that require investment to meet applicable health, safety or
environmental requirements may be permissible forms of technology transfer);
NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1106(2), (6) (assuring that state parties, except when
they act in a “arbitrary or unjustifiable manner,” will ensure compliance with
domestic regulations regarding health, public safety, and conservation policies);
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, art. 8(3)(c) (ensuring
compliance with conservation measures for state parties so long as compliance is
not affected in an “arbitrary or unjustifiable manner”).
39. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22,
Annex B(4)(b) (“Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute
indirect expropriations.”); CAFTA-DR, supra note 31, Annex 10-C(4)(b)
(providing that “nondiscriminatory regulatory actions” aimed at safeguarding
public health, safety, and the environment are not expropriatory); Canada Model
BIT, supra note 30, Annex B.13(1)) (“[N]on-discriminatory measures of a Party
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such
as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.”).
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mechanism. 40 These clauses typically have the most far-reaching
effects. 41
Many treaties also place States under a continuing obligation to
uphold environmental standards. Clauses that oblige States not to
lower environmental regulations to attract foreign investments
illustrate this third type of clause. 42 These statements may be in the
preamble 43 or a free-standing clause. An example of the latter is
article 23 of the Japan-Uzbekistan BIT:
The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by investors of the other Contracting Party and of a nonContracting Party by relaxing its health, safety or environmental
measures, or by lowering its labor standards. To this effect each
Contracting Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such
measures and standards as an encouragement for the establishment,
acquisition or expansion in its Area of investments by investors of the
other Contracting Party and of a non-Contracting Party. 44

These provisions appear hortatory and aspirational in nature. Their
aim is to avoid a regulatory race to the bottom by States. Sometimes
these clauses are complemented with recourse to consultations

40. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union
and the Republic of Colombia in the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments art. VII(5), Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.
com.proxy.wcl.american.edu/CommonUI/document.aspx?id=KLI-KA-1322227-n
(foreclosing dispute settlement mechanisms in relation to disputes involving
environmental issues).
41. But see Gordon & Pohl, supra note 16, at 20 (stating that only a handful of
treaties include such provisions).
42. Id. at 21.
43. See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between
the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Republic of
Armenia, preamble, Fin.-Arm., Oct. 5, 2004, 2431 U.N.T.S. 85 (“AGREEING that
these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental
measures of general application”).
44. Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Uzbekistan for the
Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment art. 23, Japan-Uzb., Aug.
15, 2008, available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com.proxy.wcl.american.edu/
CommonUI/document.aspx?id=KLI-KA-1042201-n; see also NAFTA, supra note
31, art. 1114(2) (allowing parties to request the other to abstain from encouraging
investment by relaxing environmental regulations). But see 2012 U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, art. 12(2) n.15 (recognizing that it
would be “inappropriate” for the parties to waive or derogate from their own
environmental regulation or law in an effort to encourage investment).
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between the contracting states when one party is suspected of
relaxing its standards. 45 While they do not directly address the
balance between investment protection obligations and
environmental policy objectives, consultations potentially introduce
a novel policing function for States to safeguard existing
environmental standards. Although consultations have not been
initiated for environmental matters, this procedure was invoked
under an analogous provision of the Labor Chapter in the Dominican
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement by the United
States against Guatemala. Although the parties initially reached an
agreement, the United States subsequently announced that it was
proceeding with its labor case against Guatemala because Guatemala
failed to implement key actions under the plan. 46 This case suggests a
potentially useful role for consultations, particularly when coupled
with a dispute settlement mechanism. 47
Given that the majority of investment agreements are silent on
policy issues in general, including the environment, tribunals have
not had to grapple with thorny questions of treaty interpretation.
However, a tribunal confronted with such a provision should
endeavor to apply general principles of treaty interpretation to the
specific language of the treaty to give full effect to the parties’
intentions. For now, parties may be guided by the jurisprudence of
45. These clauses are found in Canadian and U.S. Model BITs. See, e.g., 2012
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22, art. 12(6) (“A Party may
make a written request for consultations with the other Party regarding any matter
arising under this Article.”); Canada Model BIT, supra note 30, art.11 (“If a Party
considers that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to
avoiding any such encouragement.”). A similar provision is found in NAFTA and
US-CAFTA-DR. See NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1114(2) (using language
identical to the Canada Model BIT); CAFTA-DR, supra note 31, art. 17.10
(allowing parties to request consultation for any matter considered by the treaty).
46. In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under
Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/
guatemala-submission-under-cafta-dr (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
47. See, e.g., Wolfgang Alschner & Elizabeth Tuerk, The Role of International
Investment Agreements in Fostering Sustainable Development, in INVESTMENT
LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES 217, 227
(Freya Baetens ed., 2013) (“Such an institutional mechanism facilitates
consultations over CSR, allows the adjustment of CSR policies over time, and
helps to prevent CSR-related misunderstandings and disputes.”).
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investment treaty cases on environment-related disputes, a topic
discussed in the next section.

III. TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY
JURISPRUDENCE
Since their emergence, environmental disputes have been highly
controversial and deeply polarizing. At their core, these disputes
involve States’ right to regulate for human health and environmental
reasons. Investment tribunals tasked with deciding these cases have
considered environmental issues as part of their factual analysis of
the claim rather than as questions of law.
Factually, these cases are diverse and may challenge the scientific
basis of an environmental policy or the validity of a regulatory
decision taken for reasons of natural resource conservation or
wildlife protection. However, it is rare—although not unheard of—
for an investor to complain about a State failing to apply its
environmental laws in an investment treaty claim. 48 States may also
raise environmental considerations defensively to justify the
reasonableness of the disputed regulatory action. 49 In doing so, a
State may describe the severity of an environmental issue, the
rigorous internal processes or scientific analyses leading to the
policy’s adoption, and global initiatives to combat the problem. This
information provides factual background that will usually bear on the

48. The Allard v. Barbados case provides a notable example where a claimant
argued that the host state violated domestic and international environmental norms.
Allard v. Bardados, Notice of Dispute, ¶¶ 14, 16 (UNCITRAL, Sept. 8, 2009),
http://graemehall.com/legal/index.htm. In 2009, Mr. Allard filed a notice of dispute
under the Canada-Barbados FIPA with respect to his eco-tourism project. The
Canadian investor claimed that he was forced to close the wetlands sanctuary due
to certain acts and omissions by the Barbadian government. He claimed these
actions violated the government’s domestic and international laws and amounted to
an indirect expropriation and a failure to accord fair and equitable treatment to its
investment. It bears mentioning that the breaches of environmental law were not
made as independent claims but rather were used as evidence of treaty breaches.
49. See Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and
Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV.
401, 435 (2014) (citing, as an example, a dispute between China and the European
Union over Feed-In Tariffs, which is currently being resolved through
consultations).
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tribunal’s application of the relevant treaty provision, such as fair
and equitable treatment.
Environmental facts can be relevant to legal issues relating to
jurisdiction, liability, and even damages, which this section will
discuss in turn. With regard to jurisdiction, many bilateral investment
treaties require Parties to make an investment in accordance with the
host state’s laws for the investor to avail itself of the dispute
settlement mechanism. 50 Many arbitral tribunals have recognized that
jurisdiction may be denied under this type of provision where the
underlying investment failed to comply with domestic rules. 51
Although it remains untested, an investment made in violation of a
host state’s environmental regulation could arguably fall outside the
protection of the treaty depending on the nature and gravity of the
violation.
Analyzing environmental issues can also be relevant to the merits
of the dispute. States have defended against environment-related
challenges by explaining that a legitimate and rational basis for
adopting the measure in question exists. 52 In showing that a
50. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 84-88 (2008).
51. See, e.g., Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 165 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.transnational-disputemanagement.com (agreeing with the parties that respondent’s domestic law
prohibiting “corruption” fell within the subject-matter of the legality requirement
under the relevant BIT); Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 266 (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1098.pdf (finding
that a claimant investor need only show that it had made the legally required
investment to prove an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction); Desert Line Projects LLC
v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶¶ 104-05 (Feb. 6,
2008), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC791_En&caseId=C62 (ruling against the
respondent by finding that it failed to prove that the claimant had not made the
required investment or that such an investment had failed to comply with the
respondent’s domestic laws).
52. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, Part IV Ch. D ¶ 7 (UNCITRAL 2005), http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf (“[A]s a matter of general international
law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in
accordance with due process and, which affects . . . a foreign investor or
investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific
commitments had been given . . . that the government would refrain from such
regulation.”).
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governmental action or regulation aims to combat a serious
environmental concern, a State may show that the act was neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory. 53 Likewise, under the police powers
doctrine, 54 a State may not be found liable for a measure with an
expropriatory effect so long as it was enacted in accordance with due
process, for a public purpose such as sustainable development, and
on a non-discriminatory basis. 55
When assessing the reasonableness of a particular measure,
tribunals have often focused their analysis on several key issues.
First, some tribunals have examined the State’s motives for adopting
the measure in question to determine if the regulation constitutes a
disguised protectionist measure. For example, in S.D. Myers Inc. v.
Canada, 56 the tribunal concluded that a ban on the export of
polychlorinated biphenyls (in line with the Basel Convention) was
designed in part to economically benefit the Canadian hazardous
waste disposal industry. 57 As a result, the measure was held to violate
Canada’s obligations under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) against nationality-based discrimination. 58
Second, tribunals have focused on a measure’s effect on foreign
investors to determine whether it was proportionate to the public
interest requiring protection. In one such case, Tecnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, 59 the
tribunal considered whether Mexico’s non-renewal of the investor’s
permits to operate a landfill purportedly for environmental reasons

53. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 14-15 (holding that, given the respondent’s scientific
impetus for implementing the regulation at issue and the manner in which the
regulation was promulgated, the claimant failed to show the respondent’s actions
were discriminatory).
54. See infra Section IV.C.1.
55. See id.
56. Partial Award on Liability, ¶ 155 (UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer
Law Int’l) (stating that the “indirect motive” of ensuring the strength of local
industry was “understandable,” but not a lawful means for ensuring Canada’s
economic well-being).
57. See id. ¶ 252 (determining whether the policy was impermissibly
protectionist under NAFTA by assessing whether the measure created a policy
favoring nationals over non-nationals).
58. Id. ¶ 256.
59. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev.
FILJ 158 (2004).
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was reasonably proportional. 60 In the tribunal’s view, Mexico based
its decision upon the community’s opposition to the landfill, which
did not give rise to “a serious urgent situation, crisis, need or social
emergency” that was proportionate to the deprivation of the
investment’s economic value. 61
Third, the tribunal’s level of engagement with scientific evidence
is relevant to its decision on the measure’s reasonableness. 62 That is,
the degree of deference accorded to the scientific determinations of
State agencies reflects the willingness of tribunals to evaluate the
robustness of this evidence. For example, in Glamis Gold, Ltd. v.
United States, 63 which involved a challenge to California’s
mandatory backfilling regulation, the tribunal determined that it was
inappropriate to apply domestic deference from national court
systems. 64 Rather, the tribunal considered the legal standard already
accorded that deference. 65 As such, it did not add to that standard. 66
Taking a slightly different approach, the tribunal in Chemtura Corp.
v. Canada 67 declined to consider whether the chemical lindane posed

60. See id. ¶¶ 19, 49 (“The Respondent stresses the negative attitude of the
community towards the landfill due to its location and to the negative and highly
critical view taken by the community with regard to the way Cytrar performed its
task of transporting and confining the hazardous toxic waste originating in the
former lead recycling and recovery plant . . . which would highlight the importance
of demanding strict compliance with the new permit granted”).
61. See id. ¶¶ 139, 144, 151 (finding the respondent was engaged in an
expropriation because the respondent failed to show any evidence that the landfill
posed a real or potential threat to the environment or public health or that
community backlash against the claimant was severe enough to warrant reneging
on its obligations).
62. See generally Céline Lévesque, Science in the Hands of International
Investment Tribunals: A Case for ‘Scientific Due Process’, 20 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L
L. 259, 277 (2009) (exploring the concept of “scientific due process” in order to
suggest criteria that tribunals might consider when applying investment treaty
standards); Marcos A. Orellana, The Role of Science in Investment Arbitrations
Concerning Public Health and the Environment, 17 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 48, 4950 (2006) (arguing that a focus on scientific due process would relieve tribunals
from deciding the truth of scientific claims).
63. Award (UNCITRAL June 8, 2009) (Kluwer Law Int’l).
64. See id. ¶ 617 (“The Tribunal disagrees that domestic deference in national
court systems is necessarily applicable to international tribunals.”).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Award (UNCITRAL 2010) (Kluwer Law Int’l).
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a danger to human health or the environment. 68 The tribunal
concluded that it was inappropriate for it to judge the correctness or
adequacy of Canada’s pest management agency’s scientific
determinations regarding the environmental and health risks
associated with the pesticide. 69 Instead, it considered the
administrative process followed and global initiatives to ban the
substance in assessing whether the agency conducted the scientific
review as part of its regulatory mandate and its international
commitments rather than as a result of a trade irritant. 70 Accordingly,
a tribunal that defers to the State on the scientific merits of a given
policy will opt instead to evaluate the regulatory process followed by
policymakers.
The tribunal’s decision in Methanex Corp. v. United States 71
illustrates the weighing of these various factors. 72 The case arose
from California’s ban on the sale and use of the gasoline additive
methyl tertiary-butyl ether (“MTBE”). 73 Based on the findings of a
research team at the University of California (“UC Report”) 74 on the
effects of MTBE, California policymakers determined that the
chemical posed a risk to groundwater and drinking water due to
leaking underground fuel storage tanks. 75 Methanex, a large

68. See id. ¶ 134 (“The Tribunal notes at the outset that it is not its task to
determine whether certain uses of lindane are dangerous, whether in general or in
the Canadian context . . . . [and it] is not to second-guess the correctness of the
science-based decision-making of highly specialized national regulatory
agencies.”).
69. See id. ¶ 153 (adding that it cannot question the scientific findings of a
government agency, even when divergence of opinions is expressed within the
agency).
70. See id. ¶ 137 (determining whether the ban was a “trade irritant” solely
based on economic policies or whether it implements a legal commitment
undertaken pursuant to the Aarhus Protocol to the United Nations Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention).
71. Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part II Ch. D ¶ 2
(UNCITRAL 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
72. See, e.g., id. Part III Ch. B ¶ 57.
73. Id. Part I Preface ¶ 1.
74. The UC Report was a massive collaborative effort involving more than
sixty researchers whose work spanned five volumes and consisted of seventeen
papers. Id. Part III Ch. A, ¶ 3.
75. See id. Part II Ch. D ¶ 15 (noting that, by California law and given the
findings on MTBE, the Governor was required to either certify MTBE was
hazardous to the public health or certify that it posed no health risks whatsoever).
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Canadian producer of a component used to manufacture MTBE,
brought a claim under NAFTA for $970 million for losses caused by
the ban. 76 The company argued that banning one component of
reformulated gasoline but allowing other dangerous components was
irrational and exposed California’s true motives to benefit the U.S.
ethanol industry. 77 The parties each presented expert witnesses to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the UC Report. 78 The award
summarizes the administrative process followed, the main findings
of the report, and the testimony of the parties’ experts. After
weighing this evidence, the tribunal concluded that the UC Report
reflected “a serious, objective and scientific approach to a complex
problem.” 79 Focusing on the scientific process, the tribunal surmised
that the report was not a sham because it had been subject to an open
and informed debate. 80 Although the tribunal did not make a
determination on the scientific merits of the UC Report, it stated that
it was not persuaded that the report was scientifically incorrect. 81
Accordingly, the tribunal found that the California ban was a lawful
regulation and did not amount to an expropriation. 82
Finally, a tribunal’s findings on environmental issues can in some
cases limit an investor’s entitlement to compensation where a State
has been found liable for breaching an investment obligation. For
example, a State could argue that widespread adoption of an
76. Id. Part I.
77. See Methanex Corp., Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and
Merits, Part II Ch. D ¶¶ 24-25 (discussing the claimant’s argument that California
should have banned all USTs, rather than just MTBE, indicating an obvious bias
existed and California’s decision was arbitrary).
78. Id. Part III, Ch. A ¶ 41 (recognizing that expert reports went “to the heart
of the question of whether the US measures . . . constitute[d] a sham environmental
protection in order to cater to local political interests or in order to protect a
domestic industry.”) (internal quotes omitted).
79. Id. Part III Ch. A ¶ 101.
80. See id. (“In particular, the UC Report was subjected at the time to public
hearings, testimony and peer-review; and its emergence as a serious scientific work
from such an open and informed debate is the best evidence that it was not the
product of a political sham engineered by California”).
81. Id. (acknowledging that it is “possible for other scientists and researchers
to disagree in good faith with certain of its methodologies, analyses and
conclusions”).
82. See id. Part IV Ch. D ¶ 15 (concluding that California’s regulations were a
legitimate exercise of its authority and not an expropriation because the regulations
had a public purpose, were non-discriminatory, and subject to due process).
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international environmental law would have limited the future
profitability of the investment or would have made future profits
entirely speculative. 83 Chemtura Corp. illustrates this argument. 84
The claimant was a U.S. chemical manufacturer that challenged a
Canadian federal measure that banned the application of lindane on
canola, which had been the primary use of the pesticide. Chemtura
argued that the Special Review, which was conducted by Canada’s
Pest Management Regulatory Agency to assess the risks of lindane,
was flawed. Canada’s scientific findings were consistent with many
other countries’ findings that had also decided to phase out the use of
lindane because of its risks to human health and the environment. In
its defense, Canada presented evidence of national, regional, and
international initiatives aimed at reducing and eliminating lindane. 85
Canada argued that Chemtura’s damages claim for lost future profits
was limited or nil due to the loss of markets in the United States and
elsewhere from the progressive ban of the chemical. 86 Ultimately, the
tribunal did not discuss damages, having dismissed all of Chemtura’s
claims. 87
International investment treaty jurisprudence suggests that
tribunals consider environmental issues as factual rather than legal
matters. Because States often rely on environmental considerations
to explain a measure’s legality and reasonableness, a tribunal’s
findings on these factual issues will impact how it assesses whether
the State has violated a treaty obligation. A tribunal’s findings on

83. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award on the Merits, ¶¶ 188-91 (May 20,
1992), 8 ICSID Rev. 328 (1993) (rejecting the claimant’s lost profits claim because
the tourist development project was in its infancy at the date of breach and its lost
sales would have been limited when Egypt registered the Pyramids Plateau under
the UNESCO Convention).
84. See generally Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, (UNCITRAL Aug. 2,
2010) (Kluwer Law Int’l).
85. Lindane had been found to accumulate in human tissue, cause nervous
system damage, and persist and bioconcentrate in various food chains. See id. ¶
135-36 (noting that, in addition to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants, which includes a provision that calls for eliminating the use of lindane,
at least twenty-one States had banned or restricted the use of lindane).
86. See generally Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Canada’s Counter-Memorial, ¶¶
919, 1005 (UNCITRAL 2008) (arguing that the claim for lost profit was too
speculative as other countries also were banning the substance).
87. Chemtura Corp., Award, Part V.
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environmental facts can also be relevant to other legal
determinations, such as jurisdiction and an investor’s entitlement to
compensation as well as the quantum of damages owed. However,
these decisions leave unanswered questions about evaluating
government motives, conflicting scientific evidence, and the
regulatory choices of States in implementing public policy
objectives. In particular, the case law leaves open the fundamental
question of the appropriate standard by which to review regulations
addressing public health and the environment. In the following
section, this article addresses these shortcomings and proposes
potential ways that investment arbitration can be made more
responsive to environmental concerns.

IV. THE WAY FORWARD: MANAGING
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES MORE EFFECTIVELY
IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
As investment treaty jurisprudence demonstrates, many challenges
in adjudicating environmental disputes exist. First, most bilateral
investment treaties do not reference substantive policy issues and
thus tribunals have no guidance on how to weigh ecological aims of
governmental measures. 88 Including robust exception provisions in
investment treaties may help tribunals to avoid examining and
making value judgments on the legitimacy of State objectives and
policy choices. 89 Concomitantly, imposing obligations on States
88. See generally Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158
(establishing that it is in the tribunal’s purview to weigh the reasonableness of a
State’s regulation, while acknowledging the due deference owed to the State in
defining its public policy); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 23
(UNCITRAL June 8, 2009) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (holding that international
tribunals do not necessarily need to afford deference to domestic decisions, as it is
already reflected in the standard of review); S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial
Award on Liability, ¶¶ 255, 263 (UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer Law Int’l)
(ruling against respondent on the grounds that, although ensuring the strength of
domestic business was a legitimate state aim, the methods used amounted to
expropriation and thus were impermissible under NAFTA).
89. See generally 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 22,
Annex B(4)(b) (providing that non-discriminatory regulatory actions designed for
legitimate “public welfare objectives” do not constitute indirect expropriations,
except in “rare circumstances”); CAFTA-DR, supra note 31, Annex 10(C)(4)(b)
(providing an identical policy space provision to the U.S. BIT); Canada Model
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without any corresponding obligations on investors can lead to
unbalanced outcomes that undermine the legitimacy of the system. 90
For example, balancing the rights and responsibilities under treaties
by increasing the availability of counterclaims by States under BITs
may help redress this concern.
Second, cases involving environmental disputes often involve
complicated technical issues. 91 Without direction from the treaty,
tribunals have focused on either the merits of the scientific evidence
or the scientific process that regulators follow. 92 Tribunals that opt
for the former approach face the daunting task of assessing the
reliability of conflicting scientific evidence presented by each party.
To aid in analyzing this complex technical evidence, disputing
parties and arbitrators may avail themselves of currently underutilized procedural and evidentiary means. First, international
environmental courts and specialized arbitral rules offer a promising
alternative to ensure that the process is sensitive to the issues raised
in these disputes. 93 Second, increased participation of non-disputing
parties could contribute to the tribunal’s understanding of the wider
interests at stake and assuage criticisms regarding the democratic
BIT, supra note 30, Annex B.13(1)(c) (providing an identical policy space
provision to the U.S. BIT and CAFTA but further defining the rare circumstances
as situations where “a measure or series of measures are so severe in the light of
their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and
applied in good faith”).
90. See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing
Investment Law, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 461, 462-63 (2013) (using the
example of a State’s inability to file a claim under most investment treaties to
demonstrate the imbalance of power between investors and States).
91. See, e.g., Gail Bingham, Pamela Esterman & Christopher Riti, Effective
Representation of Clients in Environmental Dispute Resolution, 27 PACE ENVT’L.
L. REV. 61, 63 (2009) (“Environmental disputes also tend to involve complex
technical issues and scientific uncertainty. There are typically gaps in scientific
information, different models or assumptions for interpreting existing data, and
multiple disciplines each with their own terminology, and all of which complicate
the dispute.”).
92. Compare Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, Part III Ch. A ¶¶ 101, 102(2)-(4) (UNCITRAL 2005),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf (considering whether the
study predicating the MTBE ban was conducted in good faith rather than whether
it was methodologically sound or empirically correct), with Chemtura Corp.,
Award ¶ 153 (forgoing consideration of scientific evidence in favor of deferring to
State and international practice regarding the regulation of lindane).
93. See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
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deficit in investment arbitration. 94 Finally, the precautionary
principle may provide a useful device to assess and weigh scientific
evidence associated with high levels of uncertainty and risk. 95
Moreover, tribunals may have recourse to certain conceptual tools,
in the form of administrative standards of review and defenses, 96 in
cases where the focus turns to the scientific process followed by
regulators. Such analyses could provide a means to balance the
regulatory powers of States against the commercial interests of
foreign investors. Utilizing the concept of police powers, applying
the margin of appreciation to government conduct, and assessing the
proportionality of state action vis-à-vis the harm done are legal tools
most adept to assessing procedures followed by States. 97

A. REVISING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
The rise of BITs and investment arbitration cases has increased the
exposure of States to challenges for regulatory conduct taken for
environmental or health reasons. 98 This growth of investor-state
arbitrations with an environmental dimension should cause States to
take a serious look at their investment treaties to ensure that the
sustainable development goals of policymakers are adequately
reflected and placed on an equal plane with economic growth. To
achieve this, States can modify their BIT Models and future treaties
to include more robust exception clauses and counterclaim
provisions. Despite their friction at times, these policy goals do not
94. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
95. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.; see also Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5, 31
I.L.M. 8744 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (“In order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”).
96. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 36.
97. Infra Section IV.C.
98. Presently, there are approximately 3,200 agreements in existence.
According to one recent survey, at least ninety-five countries have had to respond
to one or more of the 500 plus treaty-based disputes. Towards a New Generation of
International Investment Policies: UNCTAD’s Fresh Approach to Multilateral
Investment Policy-Making, UNCTAD 4-5 (July 2013), http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d6_en.pdf [hereinafter Towards a New
Generation of International Investment Policies].
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have to conflict because sustainable development can complement
economic growth objectives through responsible investment.
1. Robust Exception Clauses
States have begun to ensure that environmental policy goals are
reflected in bilateral investment treaties and regional agreements in
various ways. While preamble clauses recognizing environmental
protection objectives and provisions discouraging regulatory
slackness tend to be dull tools,99 a clearly drafted exception clause
may offer better protection against challenges to legitimate
environmental measures. An exception clause allows States to
reserve wider policy space to respond to new circumstances with
greater regulatory flexibility. 100
Exception clauses can designate subjects, such as endangered
species, biodiversity, toxic chemicals, and air pollution, that are
immune from investment claims. However, in a rapidly changing
world, it is unlikely that all future environmental challenges can be
anticipated in advance. Moreover, failing to anticipate an area of
environmental concern might have the unintended consequence of
limiting the range of legitimate objectives available to the State. 101 A
more practical solution might be to exclude measures adopted for
environmental reasons from certain investment disciplines, such as
indirect expropriation. 102 Carving out treaty obligations instead of
broadly excluding environmental disputes from dispute settlement
provisions should also ensure that the rights of foreign investors are
adequately protected.
Including exception clauses offers potential advantages. First, it
provides States with greater policy space to address environmental
problems without breaching certain international investment
99. See supra Section II.
100. See Robert Volterra, Memorandum for the Workshop on Global Investment
Governance, BLAVATNIK SCH. OF GOV’T 30 (June 28, 2012), http://www.bsg.ox.
ac.uk/events/multilateral-liberalisation-through-bilateral-treaties (noting that States
may be restrained by BITs that do not include exception clauses, which often
reserve more power to States to use regulatory measures in case of a crisis).
101. See Newcombe, supra note 32, at 358 (stating that some arbitral tribunals
may interpret general exception provisions as limiting, rather than empowering,
state regulatory power).
102. See supra note 39.
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obligations. Second, exception clauses can be implemented with
relative ease when the political will exists between the States. Third,
a facially legitimate and non-discriminatory regulation combined
with a robust exceptions clause should avoid the need for tribunals to
scrutinize the entire realm of government motives. To accomplish
these objectives, it is imperative to ensure that tribunals give full
effect to these provisions.
2. Counterclaims Provisions
Investor-state arbitration is often viewed as a one-way street, and
States rarely file counterclaims against investors. 103 The current
language and orientation of investment treaties may be one reason
for this. The challenge for States bringing counterclaims in disputes
arising under a treaty is identifying the investor’s specific obligations
and thus the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 104 Indeed, the
signatories—and thus the parties bound—to the investment treaty are
only the host state and the national state, and not the investor.
Another hurdle in environmental cases is that tribunals may be
reluctant to interpret BITs in ways that impose liability for the
externalities associated with investment activity, such as breaches of
human rights or harm to the environment.

103. José Antonio Rivas, ICSID Treaty Counterclaims: Case Law and Treaty
Evolution, 11 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. no. 1, 2014, at 2, available at
http://www.transnational-disputemanagement.com/search/get_page.asp?v2=down
load&v1=tv11%2D1%2Darticle68%2E.pdf (positing that investors have initiated
nearly all ICSID cases brought pursuant to a treaty, as opposed to a contract); see
also Alschner & Tuerk, supra note 47, at 226 (“IIAs do little to ensure that [S]tates
get the development contribution they seek from foreign investment in return for
tying their hands in an international agreement.”); Yaraslau Kryvoi, Counterclaims
in Investor-State Arbitration 9-10 (Lon. Sch. Econ. & Political Sci., LSE Law,
Soc’y & Econ. Working Paper No. 8/2011, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1891935 (stating that the “vast majority” of BITs are silent on the issue of
counterclaims).
104. See, e.g., Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 869
(Dec. 7, 2011), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2431_En&caseId=C70 2011) (finding
the language of the BIT to “undoubtedly limit jurisdiction to claims brought by
investors”); Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶¶
216, 222, 287, 385(1) (June 25, 2001), 17 ICSID Rev. FILJ 395 (2002)
(considering and rejecting Estonia’s counterclaim founded on proceeds illicitly
transferred out of an Estonian financial institution).
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However, when consent is clear, tribunals might not balk in
accepting jurisdiction. As the Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of
Uzbekistan tribunal recently put it when adjudicating a counterclaim
in an investment case:
In treaty arbitration, consent is achieved by the respondent State making
an offer to arbitrate when ratifying the investment treaty and the investor
accepting that offer in principle when filing the request for arbitration.
The scope of the offer is defined in the State’s investment treaty, in
particular in the dispute resolution clause of that treaty. When he initiates
arbitration under the treaty, the investor accepts the offer within the scope
defined in the treaty. 105

In this case, although the tribunal determined that the language of
the BIT covered “any dispute about an investment,” it declined to
find jurisdiction over either the main claim or the counterclaim
because it found the Claimant’s actions did not constitute an
investment within the meaning of the BIT. 106 Beyond disputes arising
out of treaty claims in which consent is not always clear, however,
disputes arising from contractual claims may encounter more success
with counterclaims due to the breach of a legal instrument under
which both parties carry obligations. 107
Investment treaties could be re-drafted to provide for express
consent for the counterclaim. For example, express language that
makes clear that the term “disputes” signifies both claims and
counterclaims or language indicating consent to the submission of
“any disputes” or “all disputes” would signal to the tribunal that
parties have granted consent. 108 Some States have begun to impose
105. Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3,
Award, ¶ 409 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com.
106. Id. ¶¶ 410-11.
107. See, e.g., Atlantic Triton v. Government of Guinea, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/1, Award, (Apr. 21, 1986), 3 ICSID Rev. 23 (1995) (finding jurisdiction
on the basis of a signed contract between the parties but rejecting the counterclaim
on the merits); Maritime Int’l Nominees Establishment v. Government of Guinea,
ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision, ¶ 8.01 (Dec. 14, 1989), 5 ICSID Rev. 95
(1990) (discussing award in which tribunal exercised jurisdiction over Guinea’s
counterclaim and upheld it for the claimant’s violation of the dispute resolution
clause, which required ICSID to handle disputes).
108. Rivas, supra note 103, at 5 (citing Inmaris v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/8, Award, ¶¶ 270, 432, (Mar. 1, 2012), Paushak v. Government of
Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 689 (UNCITRAL 2011), and

2015]

GOING GREEN

409

direct obligations on investors in their model treaties. 109 However, in
practice, it may be difficult to negotiate these provisions with some
developing states that wish to be seen as “investor-friendly” 110 or,
conversely, with capital-exporting states that wish to protect their
nationals. Because States do not know whether including
counterclaims in BITs would dry up foreign investment, States may
conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the unidentified
costs of including counterclaim provisions outweigh the buy-in that
governments could potentially receive from their constituents. 111
In the event that redrafting the dispute resolution clause is not an
option, States could opt for inserting preambular language that
promotes environmentally responsible investment in tandem with
foreign direct investment objectives, either explicitly or by reference
to other international corporate social responsibility or environmental
standards, such as the Voluntary Principles, U.N. Global Compact,
and Rio Declaration. 112 States could also include screening
Saluka Invests. BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 39 (UNCITRAL 2004)).
109. See, e.g., Alschner & Tuerk, supra note 47, at 228 (citing to Ghana’s and
Botswana’s Model BITs); see also HOWARD MANN ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NEGOTIATORS’ HANDBOOK 9, 15, 22, 29 (2d ed.
2006), available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadcmodel-bit-template-final.pdf (including multiple provisions that impose obligations
on investors, such as disclosure and contribution requirements); SOUTHERN
AFRICAN DEV. CMTY., SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE
WITH COMMENTARY 5, 32, 39 (2012), available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf (including a model
provision that imposes common obligations on both investors and States regarding
corruption and another which would ensure tribunals have jurisdiction over
breaches of such obligations).
110. It is of course open to debate whether BITs lead to more foreign direct
investment. See Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty
Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J.
337, 349 (2006) (pointing out that many international bodies, such as the
UNCTAD and World Bank, have found investment treaties have “minimal impact
on foreign investments,” although such treaties still play a large role in promoting
foreign investment relative to other driving forces).
111. Another option might be to require the investor to consent to the
submission of an ICSID counterclaim when requesting arbitration against the
State. In practice, this would likely only occur upon the State’s insistence at the
time it is notified of the dispute. See Rivas, supra note 103, at 5 (expressing doubt
that investors would willfully expose themselves to cross-claim liability).
112. See, e.g., Alschner & Tuerk, supra note 47, at 227 (discussing the
increasing rate at which free trade agreements cite to customary international
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provisions in their domestic laws 113 that allow the government to vet
potential investors before they can invest in environmentally
sensitive sectors. 114 However, this may not be a viable option for
States that lack the capacity to engage in this vetting process or are
large recipients of foreign direct investment. Finally, another option
might be to expand denial of benefits clauses 115 to prevent parties
from enjoying the treaty’s benefits if there is environmental harm
caused to the host state. Ultimately, any desired changes to a treaty’s
language or structure could be included in a State’s Model BIT.
With respect to existing treaties, there are a few options are
available. Contracting states could amend existing BITs. When
adopting this approach, States must be mindful of how existing
treaties will retrospectively impact previous investments and
potentially circumvent development-friendly provisions by using
broad most favored nation clauses. Alternatively, a State could
terminate the BIT. However, termination may not be politically
feasible. Further, many BITs provide that a State’s obligations
survive the treaty for a prescribed period of time in relation to

norms, such as U.N. Global Compact). See generally Rio Declaration, supra note
95, princ. 15 (mandating that States do not forego implementing environmental
protections simply because no scientific consensus exists); United Nations Global
Compact: Corporate Sustainability in the World Economy, U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT OFFICE (Jan. 2014), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/newsevents/
8.1/GC_brochure_FINAL.pdf (stating that businesses should adopt the
Precautionary Principle and promote sustainability policies); Voluntary Principles
on Security and Human Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 20, 2000),
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/001220_fsdrl_principles.html.
113. Smitha Francis, Rethinking Investment Provisions in Free Trade
Agreements 1, 8 (Int’l Dev. Econ. Assoc., Policy Note, 2012), available at
http://www.networkideas.org/alt/may2011/Investment_Policy_Note.pdf
(suggesting that domestic procedures for vetting investors could be imported into
the treaty through language such as “in accordance with the domestic laws of the
host state”).
114. See, e.g., MANN ET AL., supra note 109, at 22-23 (formulating a model
treaty provision requiring investors to conduct a pre-impact study before beginning
the relevant business in a contracting state); see also Alschner & Tuerk, supra note
47, at 228 (stating that screening provisions allow host states to collect valuable
information on investors so they can make informed decisions on whether to
accept investments).
115. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 31, art. 1113 (outlining the criteria by which
a state party could refuse the coverage of NAFTA when dealing with an investor
owned or controlled by a non-party state).
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investments made before the effective date of termination. 116 Perhaps
a third approach is to use regional trade agreements, which can offer
a consistent level of protection across States. 117 However, this would
require phasing out old agreements to avoid overlap and
inconsistencies. In short, revising a treaty—whether to include more
robust exception clauses, counterclaim provisions, or any other
development-friendly text—is a progressive move toward ensuring
that States consider environmental issues in investment arbitration,
but the process will likely be gradual at best.

B. PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY MEANS TO EVALUATE
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Some environmental disputes raise complicated technical issues.
Arbitrators may be asked to evaluate and reconcile conflicting
scientific evidence. As we have seen, investment treaty jurisprudence
reflects two broad approaches in dealing with scientific matters.
Some awards suggest that tribunals prefer deferring to the State’s
scientific findings and their analysis focuses on the scientific process
that regulators follow. In other cases, tribunals have opted to evaluate
the soundness of the scientific findings. This section proposes
potential mechanisms for assessing scientific evidence based on the
choice of forum or arbitral rules, the use of third party procedures,
and the application of evidentiary principles. The following section
considers what conceptual tools tribunals can apply to their
evaluation of the scientific process.
1. An International Environmental Court or Environmental Arbitral
Rules
Creating an international environmental court is an idea that has
been floated in the international community for some time. In 1993,
116. See Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES 634, 640 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1937205 (stating that it is a common tenet of
international law that treaty obligations can still persist even when the treaty
expires or a party terminates it).
117. See Towards a New Generation of International Investment Policies, supra
note 98, at 5 (noting a gradual shift towards regionalism which can promote
consistent investment rules).

412

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[30:3

the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) took heed and established a
Chamber for Environmental Matters to hear environmental disputes
between States. Acting pursuant to article 26(1) of the Statute of the
Court, the ICJ explained that the Chamber was created “[i]n view of
the developments in the field of environmental law and protection
which have taken place in the last few years” and taking into account
the need to “be prepared to the fullest possible extent to deal with
any environmental case falling within its jurisdiction.” 118 Curiously,
this Chamber has yet to be used and, in fact, the Court has suspended
elections for a bench since 2006. 119 Some commentators posit that
the Chamber fell into disuse because States have not chosen to define
their dispute as purely environmental. 120 In the foreign investment
sphere, an international environmental court is not likely to be a
viable option for the following reasons. Procedurally, this model may
not be directly transposable to investment arbitration where disputes
are heard before ad hoc tribunals according to institutional rules
specified under the treaty. 121 From a practical perspective, it is
difficult to imagine a standing body of arbitrators with the
specialized knowledge or expertise to make determinations on
scientific or technical matters.
Instead, arbitration rules designed for environmental disputes may
offer a better solution. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”)
has made great strides in this direction. In 2001, the PCA developed
the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the
118. Press Communiqué 93/20, Int’l Court of Justice, Constitution of a
Chamber of the Court for Environmental Matters (July 19, 1993), http://www.ruhruni-bochum.de/www-public/fischhcy/ICJ/E269.htm.
119. See The Court: Chambers and Committees, INT’L COURT JUSTICE,
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=4 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015)
(stating that the elections were suspended because States had not yet requested that
the Chamber hear a case).
120. See, e.g., Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts,
Tribunals and the Progressive Development of International Environmental Law,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 4 (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.oecd.org/
investment/globalforum/40311090.pdf.
121. See generally Ole W. Pedersen, An International Environmental Court and
International Legalism, 24 J. ENVTL. L. 547, 551 (2012) (arguing that the
International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation may provide an
alternative model for disputes involving non-state actors if the court moves beyond
the issuance of consultative opinions).
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Environment and/or Natural Resources. These Optional Rules are
based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules but have been modified for
disputes relating to natural resources, conservation, or environmental
protection. 122 Parties may agree to apply these rules in agreements,
contracts, treaties, or upon mutual consent. 123 The Optional Rules
contain several unique features related to: (i) appointing competent
arbitrators; (ii) selecting qualified experts; and (iii) assisting the
tribunal with evaluating scientific or technical matters. 124 For
example, the PCA provides parties with a list of arbitrators
considered to have expertise in the subject-matter of the dispute. 125
The Optional Rules also assist in the arbitrator’s understanding of
technical and scientific matters by allowing tribunals to request a
non-technical document summarizing any scientific or technical
information. 126 The Optional Rules go beyond other arbitral rules that
empower tribunals to appoint their own experts by providing support
from the Secretary-General in identifying experts. 127
122. Report, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION ¶ 17, http://www.pcacpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=503 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
123. See Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural
Resources and/or the Environment, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION 185
(June 19, 2001), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=590 [hereinafter
Perm. Ct. Arb. Optional Rules for Arbitration].
124. Id. at 187-88, 197-99; see also Natalie L. Bridgeman & David B. Hunter,
Narrowing the Accountability Gap: Toward A New Foreign Investor
Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 216 (2008)
(arguing the PCA optional rules are potentially well-suited for resolving
environmental disputes while acknowledging that the PCA has some shortcomings
as a forum, which have led to the optional rules not being used).
125. See Perm. Ct. Arb. Optional Rules for Arbitration, supra note 123, at 190
(requiring the PCA’s Secretary-General to make a list “of persons considered to
have expertise in the subject-matters of the dispute at hand” and to provide it to the
parties).
126. Id. at 197.
127. Compare id. at 198-99 (mandating that the PCA Secretary-General be
involved in calling further expert witnesses), with Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 29(1), U.N.
GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976) (stating that
a tribunal may close proceedings when the parties have no further offers of proof,
without providing any independent authority to call witnesses), and Int’l Bar
Ass’n, IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration art. 6(1)
(May 29, 2010) (allowing individual tribunals to call further expert witnesses, but
requiring the tribunal to work with the parties to determine which expert witnesses
to call).
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The PCA’s Optional Rules offer a novel approach to manage
technical and scientific issues involved in some environmental
disputes. While using experts should assist with the tribunal’s
understanding of these issues, it will also inevitably increase
arbitration costs. The parties may take steps to control these expenses
by deferring the use of experts until a later stage in the proceedings.
For example, where jurisdictional objections have been raised (that
do not involve the evaluation of technical or scientific evidence), the
parties may refrain from using experts until the merits or damages
phase. In addition, the tribunal’s understanding of technical matters
may be clarified at a manageable cost by using joint experts,
although this may be difficult to implement in practice. Exposing
experts’ evidence to external scrutiny by making pleadings publicly
available or live broadcasting oral proceedings may be another cost
effective strategy to test expert evidence. This has the added benefit
of increasing transparency in cases that often implicate public policy
issues. However, increasing transparency of written and oral
submissions is meaningless if it is not complemented with nondisputing party participation, a topic explored below.
2. Third-party Participation
Although initially disfavored, third-party participation has taken
off in investor-state arbitration in recent years, most notably in the
form of amicus curiae written submissions. 128 The structural shift in
the various sets of arbitration rules may allow for more meaningful
third-party participation in investor-state disputes. 129
128. Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration:
The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 200, 201 (2011) (discussing other forms of third-party participation
including publishing documents, granting access to hearing, and presenting and/or
testifying at hearings).
129. In general, tribunals are increasingly engaged in third-party participation
despite the fact that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules neither authorize nor
expressly prohibit third-party participation. See G.A. Res. 31/98, supra note 127,
arts. 4-5 (allowing parties to enlist the help of third-parties, while requiring parties
to give notice to other litigants as to the nature of the third-party’s assistance).
However, the Commission adopted a set of rules in April 2014 that aim to improve
transparency in investor-state arbitration. These new rules shift the underlying
assumption of privacy in these disputes to one of transparency. Articles 4 and 5 of
the Rules govern participation by third-parties and non-disputing states and affirm
the authority of investment tribunals to accept submissions from them. U.N.
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Third-party participation provides an opportunity to bring
scientific or technical points, other facts, or laws to the attention of
the tribunal. Historically, the special perspective or expertise
provided to the court or tribunal justified amicus participation. 130 For
example, in Methanex, the U.S. government argued its case on public
health grounds while the amici raised environmental law issues not
otherwise addressed. 131 While interested third parties could always

COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN
TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 8-9 (2013), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Ruleson-Transparency-E.pdf. In July 2014, UNCITRAL approved the Mauritius
Convention on Transparency that increases the applicability of these transparency
rules, as they currently only apply to cases brought under treaties that were
concluded after April 1, 2014, unless parties consent to their application to earlier
treaties. Press Release, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Commission on
International Trade Law Approves Draft UNCITRAL Convention on Transparency
in TreatyBased InvestorState Arbitration, U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/202 (July
10, 2014), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2014/unis
l202.html. Most recently, in March 2015, eight States signed the Mauritius
Convention, which provides that investor-state disputes to which they are party
will be subject to the new transparency rules. U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/214,
Signing Ceremony for the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treatybased Investor-State Arbitration (March 17, 2015), available at http://www.unis.un
vienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2015/unisl214.html. In addition, in 2006, the ICSID
Rules of Arbitration were amended to explicitly recognize the tribunal’s authority
to allow third-party participation through written submissions. See ICSID
Convention, Regulations and Rules, INT’L CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES 101 (Apr. 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/
CRREnglish-final.pdf (granting authority to allow third-party participation after
certain considerations, such as whether the third-party would help reach a
determination of fact or law, whether the third-party would address an issue within
the scope of the dispute, and whether the third-party had an interest in the dispute).
Also, several States, including Canada, the United States, and Norway, now
incorporate reference to the rights of third-parties in their model BITs. See, e.g.,
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty¸ supra note 22, art. 28(3) (providing that
tribunals shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae
submissions).
130. Lance Bartholomeusz, The Amicus Curiae Before International Courts
and Tribunals, 5 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT’L L. 209, 211 (2005).
131. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Submission of Non-Disputing
Parties Bluewater Network, Communities for a Better Environment and Center for
International Environmental Law, at 2, 5 (UNCITRAL 2004),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/30472.pdf (arguing for deferential
review of California’s evidence and the particular dangers of MTBE to potable
water); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Application for Amicus Curiae Status by
the International Institute for Sustainable Development, at 2-3 (UNCITRAL 2004),
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petition the parties to the dispute with their expertise or knowledge,
allowing an independent party to provide expertise in a separate
process is valuable because it prevents disputing parties from acting
as gatekeepers of specialized knowledge.
This is certainly true in cases that implicate environmental issues.
Environmental policy usually provides the tools to evaluate
problems, such as environmental impact studies, risk assessments
(such as Environmental Risk Assessments), policy design, and costbenefit analysis. 132 Arbitral tribunals may not be best-placed to
scrutinize these assessments whereas expert non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) can provide robust and independent expert
analysis. 133 This expertise can also help in situations where the
tribunal faces the difficult task of assessing the validity of conflicting
scientific evidence from each party. 134 Such participation may
provide the tribunal with information it needs to make a decision.
Some argue that the practical burdens of arbitration increase with
more third-party participation and lead to more cost and delay for the
parties. 135 While a State may often be more willing to bear this

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/30473.pdf (discussing the host
state’s right to protect the environment and promote sustainable development in
the international law context); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Amended
Statement of Defense of Respondent, ¶ 15 (UNCITRAL 2003),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27063.pdf (conceptualizing the
California ban on MTBE as a measure to protect public health given the effects of
the chemical once it enters the water system); see also PMI v. Uruguay, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Procedural Order No. 3 (Feb. 17, 2015), www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4161.pdf (granting petition by the WHO
and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Secretariat to file a
submission providing evidence of the relationship between health warning labels
and the protection of public health).
132. Tomoko Ishikawa, Third Party Participation in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 377, 403 (2010); see generally Valentina S.
Vadi, Environmental Impact Assessments in Investment Disputes: Method,
Governance and Jurisprudence, 30 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 169 (2010) (describing
Environmental Impact Analysis as a means of avoiding dispute resolution
mechanisms in the first place).
133. See Ishikawa, supra note 132, at 403 (claiming that NGOs are “best
placed” to determine what approach to environmental issues are optimal).
134. Id.
135. See Lucas Bastin, The Amicus Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration, 1
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 208, 225 (2012) (arguing that allowing amicus
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burden given the aid that third-parties can provide to its case, thirdparties can benefit investors as well. 136 These burdens can be
minimized, however, by defining the procedures for amicus
participation, such as specifying the number and length of
submissions, stipulating the qualifications of participants, and
limiting participation to particular facts or issues. Whereas experts
add to the costs each side must bear, third-parties provide
information at little, if any, cost to the parties. In addition, these
concerns have not borne out in practice; for example, third-party
participation has not led to an unwieldy number of submissions in
the WTO or before other international tribunals. 137
Tribunals that receive evidentiary assistance through third-party
participation may have the added benefit of increasing the decision’s
legitimacy. 138 This is particularly true as arbitrations are increasingly
addressing sectors that utilize natural resources, such as water,
minerals, oil, and gas, and thus implicate public interest issues. This
has led some observers to question whether the investment
arbitration system should permit private ad-hoc tribunals composed
of foreign nationals to render judgments on democratically-enacted
legislation. 139 Thus, the perception that this process may potentially

submissions greatly increase the litigation costs of parties opposing the opinions
expressed in those submissions).
136. See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Non-Disputing Party
Submission of the National Mining Association, at 8, 10 (UNCITRAL 2006),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75179.pdf (submitting a brief
arguing that States should not abruptly change regulation regimes, as the financial
stability of the mining industry depended on a predictable legal paradigm).
137. See Kyla Tienhaara, Third-Party Participation in Investment-Environment
Disputes: Recent Developments, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L.
230, 240 (2007) (stating that it has not been the experience of the WTO that
allowing third party participation has “open[ed] the floodgates”).
138. Id. at 234-35 (quoting Suez, Sociedad General de Barcelona S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition
for Participation as Amicus Curie, ¶¶ 21-22 (Mar. 17, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. FILJ
351 (2006)); see Andrew Newcombe & Axelle Lemaire, Should Amici Curiae
Participate in Investment Treaty Arbitrations?, 5 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. &
ARB. 22, 31-32 (2001) (arguing that arbitration proceedings lack legitimacy if they
do not provide for some measure of public participation).
139. See Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment
Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic
Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 783 (2008) (positing that international
arbitration mechanisms may potentially threaten “basic principles of democracy,”
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usurp national decision-making and erode aspects of state
sovereignty can be counterbalanced with public sector or NGO
participation. 140 Such participation can promote procedural openness
by allowing public interest groups to provide particular knowledge or
insight on public policy issues. Third party participation can also
ensure that the public does not perceive the process as taking place
behind closed doors 141 or too costly or burdensome to be justified.
Beyond third-party participation, tribunals may deal with
complicated scientific evidence by shifting the evidentiary burden, as
is discussed below.
3. The Precautionary Principle
The general rule in international arbitration is that each party has
the burden of proving facts in support of its claim (“actori incumbit
probatio”). 142 Any deviation from this rule is rare. However, a
as these mechanisms are increasingly used to undermine domestic regulations
created by elected officials); Newcombe & Lemaire, supra note 138, at 29-30
(arguing that the use of amicus curie briefs counterbalance the perceived problem
of investors using international arbitration to bypass the democratic mechanisms
by which domestic regulations are passed); see also George Kahale, III, A Problem
in Investor/State Arbitration, 6 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT., no. 1, 2009, at 2-3
(discussing States’ increasing dissatisfaction with the investor-state system due to
the perception of sovereign prerogatives giving way to private interests); Public
Statement, Osgoode Hall L. Sch., Public Statement on the International Investment
Regime – 31 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/publicstatement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/ (advocating for States
to withdraw or renegotiate investment treaties to ensure they are able to effectively
advocate for their respective populations).
140. See Levine, supra note 128, at 205, 209 (noting that many investor-state
disputes involve public service sectors and that NGOs involved in related
arbitration dispute usually advocate on behalf of the public interest in these
sectors).
141. See Op-Ed, The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/27/opinion/27mon3.html?_r=1& (arguing that,
due to the great impact arbitration decisions can have on public welfare, there is an
implicit obligation that arbitrations take place in a public forum).
142. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES
(AS REVISED IN 2010) art. 27 (2011), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf; see also
MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON
EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 53 (1996) (stating the
“fundamental obligation of parties to prove their allegations”); SHABTAI ROSANNE,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-2005 1040 (2006)
(noting the application of this principle requires “the party putting forward a claim
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tribunal may adjust the burden of proof where it is difficult to
establish the environmental risk or harm of a particular activity. A
shift in the burden of proof could be achieved according to one
interpretation of the precautionary principle. 143
While no uniform definition of the precautionary principle
exists,144 it is generally understood to govern how States should
respond in situations of scientific uncertainty where there are risks of
serious or irreversible damage. Scientific uncertainty may be the
result of insufficient data, the indeterminacy of the degree of harm,
or an absence of knowledge regarding risks involved. The principle
functions to shift risk from society to those seeking to engage in
or a particular contention to establish the elements of fact and of law on which the
decision in its favour might be given.”); DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 92-93 (1939) (describing the basic rule of
burden of proof as resting on the party that asserts the affirmative of the
proposition).
143. The conceptual origin of the precautionary principle is generally traced to
the German environmental policy “Vorsorgeprinzipo” (meaning “worrying
before”). In recent years, it has emerged as a principle of international
environmental law. It first achieved global recognition at the 1992 Earth Summit
where the concept was reflected in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development. See Rio Declaration, supra note 95, princ. 15
(rejecting the requirement for absolute scientific certainty where environmental
damage may be irreversible). The principle has since been enshrined in
international environmental treaties relating to climate change, oceans and
watercourses, marine pollution, fisheries conservation, ozone layer protection,
conservation of endangered species, biological diversity, and trade in hazardous
waste. See, e.g., 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter arts. 2, 3, Nov. 7, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 1 (1997) (maritime pollution context); Agreement for the Implementation of
the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 6, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3
(1995) (fisheries context); Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic art. 2(2)(a), Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1228
(1993) (maritime pollution context); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, pmbl, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (1987)
(airborne pollution context).
144. PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 272-73 (3d ed. 2012); Daniel Kazhdan, Precautionary Pulp: Pulp Mills and
the Evolving Dispute Between International Tribunals over the Reach of the
Precautionary Principle, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 527, 529-30 (2011); see also David
VanderZwaag, The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy:
Elusive Rhetoric and First Embraces, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 355, 360 (1998)
(finding several interpretations of the concept).
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risky activities such that the latter bears the burden of proving the
safety of the proposed activities. It is based on the assumption that, in
the face of a serious risk, States should act now rather than wait to
see whether the harm occurs. In this way, the principle could be
viewed as a defensive strategy for a State that seeks to preclude
activities for which the harm is uncertain.
This approach is not without controversy. 145 There are mixed
views on when and how to use the principle, such as what level of
uncertainty is needed to invoke the principle. As a result of this lack
of precision, some non-state actors have argued that the
precautionary principle can be a form of protectionism. However, the
precautionary principle does not excuse a treaty breach. Rather, this
approach merely increases the evidentiary burden on the party
seeking to engage in harmful activity by allowing tribunals to assess
and weigh highly technical but uncertain scientific evidence on
environmental harms. While no investment treaty tribunal has
expressly applied the precautionary principle, other international
courts and tribunals have considered it, 146 suggesting that there may
be room for its application in the investor-state context. 147 The
application of the principle is highly fact-specific; nevertheless, it
could be applied in exceptional cases involving a high level of
scientific uncertainty and risk of environmental damage, such as
nuclear power. 148

145. See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Andrew Newcombe, An Integrated
Agenda for Sustainable Development in International Investment Law, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 120-21 (Marie-Claire
Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011).
146. See, e.g., Simon Marr, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: The
Precautionary Approach and Conservation and Management of Fish Resources,
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 816 (2000) (arguing that the court in the Southern Bluefin
Tuna case implicitly applied the precautionary principle).
147. See Norway Model BIT, supra note 30, art. 24(v) (referring to the right of
the contracting parties to adopt or enforce measures deemed necessary, including
under the precautionary principle, to protect the environment).
148. See CAROLINE E. FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF
PROOF AND FINALITY 18 (2011) (arguing that the high threshold requirement of an
“exceptional case” involves “the need for decision-making that errs on the side of
allowing for worst-case scenarios”).
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C. CONCEPTUAL TOOLS TO BALANCE THE REGULATORY POWERS
OF STATES WITH THE INTERESTS OF FOREIGN INVESTORS
While arbitral rules for managing expert evidence, third-party
participation, and evidentiary burden-shifting can help tribunals
better assess scientific evidence, varying standards of review and
recognition of specific defenses allow tribunals to properly evaluate
the regulatory process. Regulation is essential to state functions and
many argue this authority must be protected if the State is to act in
the public interest on environmental, health, economic, and social
issues. 149 Because of concerns regarding mounting indirect
expropriation claims that threaten this “right to regulate,” some
States have changed their approach to include more robust carve-outs
or exclusions in investment agreements. Indeed, the conceptual tools
described below can also be used as interpretive guidance for these
exceptions or carve-out clauses in treaties.
Even in the absence of such clauses, States have argued that
tribunals should defer to State regulators’ scientific findings made on
a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary basis and in accordance with
due process. Various standards of review and defenses suggest that
investment tribunals may not be best-positioned to make value
judgments on internal environmental policies, which may involve
technical expertise. 150 For example, as discussed above, in Chemtura
Corp., the tribunal noted that it was not within the scope of its task to
“second-guess the correctness of the science-based decision-making
of highly specialized national regulatory agencies.” 151

149. Rainer Geiger, Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Lessons
from the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 94, 108
(2002); see also Stephen Olynyk, A Balanced Approach to Distinguishing Between
Legitimate Regulation and Indirect Expropriation in Investor-State Arbitration, 15
INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 254, 279 (2012) (citing M. SORNARAJAH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 283 (2004)) (arguing that nondiscriminatory policy space provisions typically relate to areas of regulation
critical to state administration).
150. See, e.g., S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award on Liability, ¶ 261
(UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (holding that Chapter 11
tribunals do “not have open-ended” mandates to review the policy decisions of
States).
151. Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 134 (UNCITRAL Aug. 2, 2010)
(Kluwer Law Int’l); see also Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican
States, Award, ¶ 160 (UNCITRAL Jan. 26, 2006) (Kluwer Law Int’l).
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Balancing a State’s regulatory powers against the interests of
foreign investors is particularly apt in environmental cases. The
“chilling effect” on the host state’s environmental policy is powerful
as States already face immense pressure from domestic and
international businesses to relax their environmental standards. For
example, in Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, one of the first NAFTA cases
that involved the banning of a gasoline additive that the government
found to be toxic, Canada settled and reversed the ban in the face of
a $251 million claim and a loss on a jurisdictional ruling. 152 More
than ten years later, Canada settled another environmental case, this
time involving a challenge by the agrochemical company, Dow
AgroSciences, over a Quebec ban on the sale and use of lawn
pesticides containing the ingredient 2, 4-D. 153 Acknowledging the
complexity of these concepts and the uncertainty with which
tribunals may or may not utilize them, the following subsections
introduce potential legal tools available to tribunals when
adjudicating the right to regulate.
1. Police Powers
Customary international law establishes that certain state action is
beyond compensation under the international law of expropriation
because States enjoy wide latitude to regulate within the realm of
their police powers. 154 Police powers cover State actions such as
taxation, legislation restricting the use of property—including in
areas of planning, environment, safety, and health—and the
imposition of criminal penalties. 155 In the modern legal view of
police powers, the State is understood to regulate through a variety of

152. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Preliminary Tribunal Award on Jurisdiction
(UNCITRAL 1998), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ethyl-08.pdf.
153. See Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Canada, Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 1, 3b-c
(UNCITRAL 2011) (agreeing that Canada’s ban on 2, 4-D will remain in place and
that Canada will not have to pay damages).
154. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 cmt.
g (1987) (positing that “general taxation, regulation, forfeiture . . . or other action”
is permissible so long as it is nondiscriminatory).
155. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., EXPROPRIATION: UNCTAD SERIES
ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II, at 79, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.7 (2012) [hereinafter
UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION].
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channels and in broad areas, such as protecting the environment, and
to exercise a wide range of powers in adopting new regulations or
enforcing existing ones vis-à-vis investors. 156
Investment tribunals accepting police powers as a defense has not
been uniform. For example, in Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa
Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, 157 the tribunal took a narrow
approach to police powers, concluding that the State’s environmental
purpose had no bearing on the issue of compensation. 158 In Methanex
Corp., the tribunal recognized the State’s police powers and held that
the contested MTBE ban was a “lawful regulation and not an
expropriation.” 159 However, it somewhat limited the defense by
noting that compensation would be required if “specific
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the
then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the
government would refrain from such regulation.” 160 Chemtura Corp.
affirmed a broader reading of the principle of police powers. There,
the tribunal held that Canada’s regulations phasing out the use of a
harmful chemical, lindane, “constituted a valid exercise of
[Canada’s] police powers” and thus did “not constitute an
expropriation.” 161

156. Id.
157. ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award (Feb. 17, 2000), 15 ICSID Rev.
169 (2000).
158. Id. ¶ 72 (“[W]here property is expropriated, even for environmental
purposes, whether domestic or international, the [S]tate’s obligation to pay
compensation remains.”).
159. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, Part II Ch. D ¶ 15 (UNCITRAL 2005),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
160. Id. Part IV Ch. D ¶ 7.
161. Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 266 (UNCITRAL Aug. 2, 2010)
(Kluwer Law Int’l); see also Sedco v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., Award, 9 Iran-U.S.
CTR 248, 275 (1985) (holding that it is “an accepted principle of international law
that a State is not liable for economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide
‘regulation’ within the accepted police power of States”); Tecnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 119 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158 (2004)
(“The principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers within the
framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its
powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is
undisputable”); S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award on Liability, ¶ 281
(UNCITRAL Nov. 13, 2000) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (“The general body of precedent
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Although tribunals have accepted varying degrees of the defense,
police powers is a well-established concept in customary
international law. The question in environmental disputes is which
iteration of the doctrine a particular tribunal will apply. Moreover,
tribunals have generally only applied the principle to noncompensable expropriations rather than to other treaty breaches.
Thus, tribunals must decide how to apply tools such as the “margin
of appreciation,” discussed below, which are less established but
may be more broadly applicable. 162
2. Margin of Appreciation
The “margin of appreciation” doctrine was developed by the
European Court of Human Rights as a means to balance the
regulatory functions of the State while at the same time preserving
the Court’s ability to review decisions. 163 In investment law, the
doctrine reflects an “increasing acceptance that the examination of
the measures taken by the [S]tate should not be assessed too
finely.” 164 Indeed, even where the BIT is silent on the standard of
usually does not treat regulatory action as amounting to expropriation.”).
162. See VIÑUALES, supra note 3, at 377-78 (analyzing the margin of
appreciation standard in the Methanex Corp., Glamis Gold, Ltd., and Chemtura
Corp. decisions).
163. See James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1986),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57507 (stating that the
margin of appreciation doctrine gives States some latitude to treat parties
differently, depending on the facts of a given situation); Handyside v. United
Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16-17 (1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499 (leaving to States a margin of appreciation to
interpret and apply laws in force so long as they do so reasonably and in good
faith).
164. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 467
(3d ed. 2010). The margin of appreciation doctrine has been considered in a
number of investment cases. See, e.g., Frontier Petrol. Services Ltd. v. Czech
Republic, Final Award, ¶ 527 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010), http://www.italaw.com/
documents/FrontierPetroleumv.CzechRepublicAward.pdf (“States enjoy a certain
margin of appreciation in determining what their own conception of international
public policy is.”); Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 8.35
(UNCITRAL 2012), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2853_En&caseId=C111 (“Hungary
would enjoy a reasonable margin of appreciation in taking such measures before
being held to account under the ECT’s standards of protection.”); Cont’l Cas. Co.
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/09, Award, ¶ 181 (UNCITRAL
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review or level of deference to be applied, arbitrators resist the
impulse to review de novo a State’s assessment of a situation and
apply the remedies as they see fit. 165
The doctrine differs from police powers in several ways. 166 Unlike
police powers, international tribunals have applied the margin of
appreciation to all claims, not just expropriation allegations in the
investment arbitration context.167 The theoretical underpinning for
deferring to state action also differs: police powers are based on the
State’s sovereign right to regulate whereas the margin of
appreciation applies a level of review to the policy assessments of
state agencies akin to administrative law. Accordingly, police powers
implicate state liability under legal rules while the margin of
appreciation is applied to factual analysis without directly impacting
a State’s liability to pay compensation.
Tribunals have been known to apply—implicitly or explicitly—the
margin of appreciation in addressing the scientific process followed
by the relevant state agency in environmental cases. For example, in
Methanex Corp. and Glamis Gold Ltd., the tribunals “considered that
their role was not to judge the scientific conclusions on which the
measures challenged by the investors were based, but only the
acceptability of the process followed to reach such conclusions.” 168
The Chemtura Corp. tribunal took a more modulated approach that
acknowledged the presence of “highly specialized domains involving
scientific and public policy determinations,” but noted that “[t]his is
not an abstract assessment circumscribed by a legal doctrine about

Sept. 5, 2008) (Kluwer Law Int’l) (affirming a State’s right to apply a “significant
margin of appreciation” for measures taken during emergencies).
165. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 36, at 371 (stating that the
margin of appreciation doctrine is generally triggered when a BIT lists permissible
objectives or uses language that suggests deference is due to state parties).
166. See VIÑUALES, supra note 3, at 379-80 (arguing that the ultimate
difference between police powers and the margin of appreciation doctrine is one of
right versus process and articulating that the former doctrine empowers the State to
act on its “inherent duty” to protect the public and is more deferential to state
action, while the latter concerns itself more with how a decision was reached and
whether it was equitable).
167. See, e.g., id. at 376-77 (discussing how the European Court of Human
Rights developed the margin of appreciation doctrine in the context of claims
involving human rights derogation).
168. Id. at 377-78.
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the margin of appreciation” and that “[i]t is an assessment that must
be conducted in concreto.” 169 On the facts of the case, the tribunal
considered it appropriate to apply deference in its decision. 170
Other tribunals have cautiously approached the margin of
appreciation doctrine as well. At least one tribunal has observed that
the margin of appreciation under the European Court of Human
Rights jurisprudence is “not found in customary international law or
the [investment] [t]reaty [at issue].” 171 Indeed, some scholars insist
that the margin of appreciation is a human rights concept that has
little or no application to investment cases. 172 Yet, tribunals are
increasingly finding themselves confronted with similar regulatory
issues that come up in more public-oriented areas of the law. Thus,
while not as widely accepted as police powers in international
investment law, the margin of appreciation could offer an additional
conceptual framework to utilize when assessing claims involving
scientific and technical regulations.
3. Proportionality
Proportionality is a general legal principle and one closely
associated with the margin of appreciation in international law. It
refers to weighing a State’s implementation of its policy goals
against the protected rights of an investor. 173 How the tribunal
conducts this weighing process varies. For example, a tribunal
applying the margin of appreciation to its proportionality assessment

169. Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 123 (UNCITRAL Aug. 2, 2010)
(Kluwer Law Int’l).
170. Id.
171. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award,
¶ 354 (Jan. 17, 2007) (Kluwer Law Int’l).
172. See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal
Standards, 31 INT’L L. & POL. 843, 843-44 (1999) (noting that the margin of
appreciation imbues a “state-bias” into a process that is intended to be based on
equality); Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualizing the Standard of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1, 10 (2012)
(following a private international law paradigm that affords deference to one
disputing party but not the other could be viewed as an “arbitral heresy”).
173. See generally Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health
Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 1, 22 (2011) (arguing that generally applying the doctrine of proportionality is a
fact-specific exercise that varies case-by-case).
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will tip the deferential balance in favor of the State. 174
This analysis acknowledges that the investor should have the
opportunity to show the tribunal that the state action is
disproportionate to the State’s aim while it also considers the State’s
factual findings underpinning the regulation from which the investor
claims harm. 175 The tribunal would accordingly undertake a factual
proportionality assessment that carefully balances the interests
involved, such as whether the measure falls within a recognized
police power of the host state, the public purpose and effect of the
measure, any potential discrimination, and the relationship between
the means employed and the aim sought to be realized. 176 Additional
factors include the economic impact of the regulations on the
investor and the investor’s legitimate expectations at the time of
investment. 177
The European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence reinforces the
“reasonable balance” to be struck between community interests and
the private interests of alleged victims of the offending conduct. 178
Some tribunals of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes have affirmed this. For example, in Tecmed, the
tribunal applied a proportionality analysis to distinguish between a
compensable indirect expropriation and a non-compensable
regulation. 179 The tribunal assessed “whether such actions or
measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected
thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking
into account that the significance of such impact has a key role upon
174. See id. at 23 (pointing to LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev.
203 (2006), which held that States may take proportional steps to protect the public
welfare).
175. See id. at 35 (proposing that, if an investor has an opportunity to
demonstrate a state action is not proportional, the tribunal will be better able to
make a well-balanced analysis).
176. Id. at 23, 35.
177. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 155, at 62.
178. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], “Indirect Expropriation”
and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law 17 (Org. for Econ.
Co-Operation & Dev. Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 2004/04,
2004), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321.
179. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 66 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ
158 (2004).

428

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[30:3

deciding the proportionality.” 180 Similarly, in Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 181 the tribunal determined that
proportionality is a requirement under general international law. 182
Influenced by Tecmed, the Occidental Petroleum Corp. tribunal
determined that the “test at the end of the day will remain one of
overall judgment, balancing the interests of the State against those of
the individual, to assess whether the particular sanction is a
proportionate response in the particular circumstances.” 183
Investment arbitration falls within the gray area between public
international law, in which qualified deference to the State exists,
and international commercial law, in which public elements of a
dispute are not typically addressed. The key questions with these
various doctrines therefore is how much deference is appropriate to
grant, whether resorting to an extra-treaty standard of deference is
appropriate and, if so, whether environmental regulation should be a
“special case” militating towards a greater measure of deference.
Because environmental protection involves public interest
considerations, it may be appropriate to apply administrative
standards of review and/or consider deferential defenses. This is
particularly true where the State accrues no benefit or even incurs a
loss from the action. Ultimately, these conceptual tools offer
convenient devices for arbitral tribunals that wish to consider the
special circumstances surrounding cases involving environmental
issues. 184

180. Id. ¶ 122; see also LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 195 (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev.
203 (2006) (endorsing Tecmed’s proportionality approach); Saluka Investments
BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶¶ 305-07 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf (balancing
proportionality, on the one hand, and the respondent’s right to exercise police
powers, on the other).
181. ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (Oct. 5, 2012), https://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docI
d=DC2672_En&caseId=C80.
182. Id. ¶ 427.
183. Id. ¶ 417.
184. A fourth potential defense doctrine is that of necessity or public
emergency. While this defense has not yet been invoked in cases concerning
environmental issues, it has been used in other contexts. See generally VIÑUALES,
supra note 3, at 385 (“Public emergency clauses and the necessity defence have
been invoked together in the context of a series of investment disputes relating to
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite the increasing number of cases involving the environment,
investment treaties themselves are not well-equipped to provide
guidance to tribunals on environmental issues. As a result, these
issues are generally handled on a case-by-case basis with tribunals
assessing the overall reasonableness of the state policy or regulatory
process followed. All the while, tribunals attempt the formidable, and
at times seemingly impossible, task of balancing the public interests
that the State represents and the negative impact of measures on
foreign investments.
Despite these theoretical and structural burdens, the arbitral
system allows for much discretion on the part of the tribunal. In the
short term, relying on the tribunal’s use of appropriate standards of
review and properly considering factors, such as the legitimacy of
the State’s aim, the nature of the measure, and due process, can help
lead to decisions that better consider environmental harm.
Encouragingly for the long-term, States have begun to recognize the
importance of environmental issues in their treaty negotiations. 185
Even with new treaties, however, a key question will continue to be
how much tribunals should look at the merits of the State’s action
rather than the process in which the policy was made. While
indiscriminate deference is a crude tool, this article recommends that
tribunals also avoid de novo review. Balancing these two positions
poses a challenge for arbitrators. Ultimately, the goal for the arbitral
system is to develop the capacity to seriously consider the public
policy issues and environmental concerns often at stake while fairly
adjudicating the claims of investors harmed by state action.

the Argentine crisis of 2001-3. Although most of these cases do not concern
environmental issues, they remain relevant to assess the potential operation of
emergency and necessity clauses in connection with such issues.”).
185. International organizations are responding to States’ interest in reforming
the investment regime. For example, UNCTAD is supporting a coordinated and
sustainability-oriented approach to international investment reform through its
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development. This type of guidance
may help expedite system reform in a way that supports environmental
considerations. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTMENT POLICY
FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2-3 (2012), available at
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2012d6_en.pdf.

